The Enemy Already Has Your Face

The Enemy Already Has Your Face

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For a long time, we learned to trust what we see and hear. If we saw someone in a video call, we assumed that person was really there. If we recognised the voice of a family member, we believed it was genuinely them. If we received a message or an instruction accompanied by a familiar voice or image, our natural reaction was to trust it.

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That assumption is no longer valid.

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Artificial Intelligence can now generate images, videos and voices capable of imitating real people with such a high level of realism that, in many cases, it is extremely difficult to distinguish what is genuine from what is synthetic. Deepfakes are no longer merely a technological curiosity or a tool used to create humorous content. They have become a real threat to individuals, businesses and institutions.

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The problem is not simply the ability to create a fake face. It lies in the possibility of combining different technologies to build an entire digital identity. An attacker can use a photograph available online, clone a voice from just a few seconds of audio and generate an interaction capable of simulating a real person.

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From that moment on, the attack no longer depends exclusively on malware, vulnerability exploitation or unauthorised access to systems.

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It may depend solely on trust.

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Imagine receiving a call from someone who appears to be your manager and speaks with their voice. Imagine receiving a video call from an executive within your organisation requesting an urgent transfer. Imagine receiving a call from a family member asking for financial help, using a voice that is almost indistinguishable from their real one.

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What would you do?

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Many people's natural reaction would be to believe it. That is precisely what makes deepfakes so dangerous.

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Social engineering has always exploited trust, authority, urgency and fear. Artificial Intelligence now makes these techniques far more convincing. The message can be personalised. The voice can sound familiar. The face can be recognised. The situation can appear completely legitimate.

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And yet, everything may be fake.

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This new reality forces us to rethink some of our traditional validation mechanisms. For decades, a person's voice has been used as a way to confirm their identity. Video calls added an extra layer of trust. Today, however, we can no longer assume that either of these elements is sufficient proof.

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Sensitive requests should be confirmed through independent channels. Financial transfers should include additional validation mechanisms. Changes to critical information should require confirmation. Security processes must be designed on the assumption that, in the future, an identity may be perfectly simulated.

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The challenge is not to stop using technology or to distrust every digital interaction. That would be impossible and counterproductive. Instead, we must develop a culture in which trust is accompanied by verification. Artificial Intelligence is not, in itself, the enemy. The same technologies used to create synthetic content can also be used to detect it, improve security and prepare organisations and individuals for new threats.

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The real challenge lies in the speed at which these technologies are evolving. The ability to create a deepfake is becoming increasingly accessible, while our behaviours, processes and validation mechanisms have not evolved at the same pace.

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Artificial Intelligence can already imitate people.

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The next question is:

Are we prepared to verify who is really on the other side?

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